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ERISA, EMPLOYEES, AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS: A SEARCH FOR
A CONSISTENT THEME
This Note examines the effect of the Employees Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)1 on the attempts of third party creditors
of employees to reach employees' benefit plan funds. Through ERISA,
Congress intended to ensure the equitable character and financial sound-
ness of employee benefit plans.2 That intent, however, combined with
congressional silence on the rights of creditors to reach plan funds to
satisfy employee debts3 has prevented the development of a consistent
theme in allowing creditor access to the funds in ERISA qualified plans.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM CREATED BY ERISA's SILENCE
ABOUT CREDITOR'S RIGHTS
Enacted in 1974, ERISA governs the establishment, operation and dis-
position of employee benefit plans.4 ERISA distinguishes between wel-
fare and pension benefit plans.' Welfare plans are those established or
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982, Supp. 1 1983,
Supp. 11 1984, Supp. III 1985, & Supp. IV 1986)).
2. ERISA § 2 (29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982)) sets forth the congressional findings and declaration
of policy behind ERISA:
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee benefit plans
in recent years has been rapid and substantial; that the operational scope and economic
impact of such plans is increasingly interstate; that the continued well-being and security of
millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by these plans;... that
owing to the lack of employee information and adequate safegaurds concerning their oper-
ation, it is desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, and to provide for
the general welfare and the free flow of commerce, that disclosure be made and safeguards
be provided with respect to the establishment, operation and administration of such
plans;... that owing to the inadequacy of current minimum standards, the... funds to pay
promised benefits may be endangered; that owing to the termination of plans before requi-
site funds have been accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries have been deprived of
anticipated benefits; and that it is therefore desirable in the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries, for the protection of the revenue of the United States, and to provide for the
free flow of commerce, that minimum standards be provided assuring the equitable charac-
ter of such plans and their financial soundness.
ERISA § 2 (29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1986)).
3. Prior to ERISA, the common law of trusts governed access to retirement plans. Courts
disagreed about whether retirement trusts could be protected from the reach of a beneficiary's credi-
tors. See generally 2 A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 151 (3rd ed. 1967 and Supp. 1987).
4. For an indepth discussion of ERISA and relevant tax code provisions see M. CONAN,
QUALIFIED RETIREMENT AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS, §§ 3.1-21.7 (1988). For a very
brief summary of the structure of ERISA see G. BOREN, QUALIFIED DEFERRED COMPENSATION
PLANS § 1:04 (1983).
5. ERISA § 3(3) (29 U.S.C. § 1002(3)) states: "The term 'employee benefit plan' or 'plan'
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maintained by an employer that provide for employees' health care, sick-
time, vacation, holiday, training, daycare, scholarships, legal services or
other non-income providing benefits.6 Pension plans are plans estab-
lished or maintained by an employer that provide for employees' retire-
ment income or income deferred to the end of employment with the plan
sponsor.7
Congress enacted ERISA to protect the anticipated benefits to employ-
ees and their beneficiaries under these plans. ERISA provides minimum
standards for both types of benefit plans.' ERISA's goverance of pension
benefit plans is more stringent; for example, pension plans must contain
an anti-alienation and anti-assignment of benefits provision.9 In addi-
means an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both
an employee welfare plan and an employee pension benefit plan." Id.
This Note adopts this definition of "benefit plan" and will specify welfare plan or pension plan
when addressing only that particular type of plan.
6. ERISA provides:
The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any plan, fund or
program ... established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or
by both, to the extent that such plan, fund or program was established or is maintained for
the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of
insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the
event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, ap-
prenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid
legal services, or (B) any benefit described in § 186 (c) [§ 302(c) of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947] of this title (other than pensions on retirement or death, and insur-
ance to provide such pensions).
ERISA § 3(l) (29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)).
7. ERISA provides:
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the terms "employee pension benefit plan" and
"pension plan" mean any plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an
employer or by an employee organization, or both, to the extent that by its express terms or
as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or program-
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termina-
tion of covered employment or beyond, regardless of the method of calculation the
contributions made to the plan, the method of calculating the benefits under the plan
or the method of distributing benefits from the plan.
ERISA § 3(2) (29 U.S.C.§ 1002(2)). See generally G. BOREN, supra note 4, at § 1:07 (discussing the
attributes of defined benefit pension plans).
8. See supra note 2. A mere promise to pay welfare-type benefits can constitute an ERISA
covered welfare benefit plan. Thus, arguably, a written instrument is not required to create a welfare
plan. See, eg., Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1502-04 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[E]xistence of a
written instrument is not a prerequisite to ERISA coverage."); Donovan v. Dullingham, 688 F.2d
1367, 1372 (11th Cir. 1982) ("ERISA does not require a formal written plan.").
9. ERISA provides:
(1) Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be
assigned or alienated.
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection, there shall not be taken into
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tion, plans containing such provisions fulfill some of the requirements for
tax breaks under the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.).10 The Secretary of
Labor, Secretary of Treasury and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora-
tion have the duty of enforcing and applying ERISA.11
Section 514(a) of ERISA preempts all state law relating to employee
benefit plans."2 Based on ERISA's legislative history," and this broad
preemption provision, both courts and commentators have suggested
that Congress intended the courts to create a federal common law of
employee benefit plans to fill the gaps Congress left open in the original
account any voluntary and revocable assignment of not to exceed 10 percent of any benefit
payment, or of any irrevocable assignment or alienation of benefits executed before Septem-
ber 2, 1974 [the date of enactment]. The preceding sentence shall not apply to any assign-
ment or alienation made for the purpose of defraying plan administration costs. For
purposes of this paragraph a loan made to a participant or beneficiary shall not be treated
as an assignment or alienation if such loan is secured by the participant's accrued nonfor-
feitable benefit and is exempt from the tax imposed by section 4975 of Title 26 [Internal
Revenue Code of 1954] (relating to tax on prohibited transactions).
ERISA § 206(d)(1),(2) (29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1),(2) (1982)). ERISA subjects pension plans to many
other requirements to which welfare plans are not subjected. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1086
(1982) (participation and vesting, and funding requirements).
10. I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1986). This section is almost identical to ERISA's § 206(d), supra note
9. There are other tax qualifying requirements imposed by the IRS. See G. BOREN, supra note 4,
§§ 2:09-2:15. (discussing general requirements for qualification).
11. Reorg. Plan No. 4 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. § 332 (1978), reprinted in 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982), and
in 92 Stat. 3790 (1978), arranges responsibilities between the Secretary of Treasury and the Secretary
of Labor. The Plan is not a statute. However, as a result of the plan ERISA statutes do not accu-
rately reflect the responsibilities for enforcement and interpretation of ERISA. BOREN, supra note 4,
§ 1:04 n.2. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation is a government agency within the Depart-
ment of Labor. Among other things the corporation is enpowered to insure many defined pension
plans in order to provide uninterrupted payment of pension benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982). Title
III of ERISA (29 U.S.C. §§ 1201-42) describes the division of power between the Secretary of Labor,
Secretary of Treasury and the Corporation. However, Title III must be read in conjunction with the
Reorganization Plan. Title IV (29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-68) of ERISA describes the powers of the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation. See generally BOREN, supra note 4, § 1:04 (summarizing the division
of authority over ERISA and the powers of the Pension Plan Guaranty Corporation); CONAN, supra
note 4, §§ 22.1-21.5 (discussing enforcement of ERISA).
12. ERISA provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this title and title IV
shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)] and not exempt under
section 4(b) [29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)]. This section shall take effect on January 1, 1975.
ERISA § 514(a) (29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)). Part (b) of section 514 contains several exemptions to this
broad preemption clause, most notably the exemption for state laws regulating insurance.
13. "It is also intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to
deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans." 120
CONG. REc. 29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 4771 (1976) [hereinafter ERISA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
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legislation. 4 One such area was the right of creditors of employees to
have access to the employees' benefit funds."5 This congressional silence,
combined with ERISA's general purpose to protect the funds of retire-
ment plans, and the need of creditors to be paid, have hindered the
courts' development of consistent guidelines in creditors' attempts to
reach an employee's benefit plan funds.
In examining this problem, Part II of this Note explains the law per-
taining to dependent or ex-spouse creditors of employees. Part III dis-
cusses the effect of ERISA on creditors' attempts to reach employees'
pension and welfare funds. Part IV explores the effect of conflicts be-
tween ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code upon bankruptcy creditors' suc-
cess in accessing benefit plan funds. Finally, Part V discusses several
solutions that would create a consistent theme in the law of creditors'
rights to reach employees' funds in ERISA benefit plans.
II. THE RIGHTS OF CREDITORS WHO ARE DEPENDENTS OR Ex-
SPOUSES OF THE EMPLOYEE-DEBTOR
A. Pre-ERISA
Prior to ERISA, the common law of trusts governed creditors' access
to employee benefit plans 6 Trust funds were considered property of the
debtor-beneficiary and available for payment of the beneficiary's debts. 17
To reach these funds, creditors needed a judgment for the amount owed,
In addition, the debtor-beneficiary must have had access to the trust
funds. 18
Problems for creditors arose when a trust contained a spendthrift pro-
vision.' 9 Such a provision explicitly bars the alienation and assignment
of trust funds and may restrict the beneficiary's access to the trust funds.
14. See, eg., G. BOREN, supra note 4, at § 16:17.60; Sherman, Spendthrift Trust and Employee
Pensions: The Problem of Creditor's Rights, 55 IND. L.J. 247, 257-58 n.42-45 (1980) (quoting Sena-
tor Javits).
15. ERISA § 206(d)(1) does not mention anything about creditors. See supra note 9. See also
Ellis Nht'l Bank of Jacksonville v. Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1986); Tenneco Inc. v.
First Virginia Bank of Tidewater, 698 F.2d 688-89 (4th Cir. 1983).
Many federal courts struggling to fill this gap have turned to state laws for analogies. See infra
notes 41-105 and accompanying text.
16. Sherman, supra note 14, at 250-52.
17. G. BOGERT, TRUST & TRUSTEES § 193 (2d ed. 1965).
18. In addition, the creditor had to show the debtor lacked enough property to pay his or her
debts before the court would grant access to the fund. Sherman, supra note 14 at 250-51.
19. Spendthrift trusts are "[t]rusts in which the interest of a beneficiary cannot be assigned by
him or reached by his creditors .... " 2 A. ScoTr, supra note 3, at § 151.
[Vol. 67:461
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Generally, spendthrift provisions are held to deny creditors access to the
funds.2" Some states' statutes provide that spendthrift provisions can
protect funds only to the extent necessary for the beneficiaries' support.21
Courts have relied considerably upon the law of spendthrift trusts to de-
termine the rights of creditors to ERISA qualified pension plan funds.22
Prior to ERISA, dependents and ex-spouses could reach retirement
trusts containing a spendthrift provision only if the trust was in pay sta-
tus. 23 The family support exception to spendthrift trust law, provided
access into the trust. The courts created this exception because of the
public policy that child support and alimony were continuing obliga-
tions, not debts, and thus transcended the limits of a spendthrift clause.24
B. Federal Common Law Exception to Section 206(d)(1) of ERISA.
ERISA Section 206(d)(1) prevents alienation or assignment of pension
plan benefits. 25 The Secretary of Treasury and various courts have inter-
preted this section to bar garnishment and attachments of ERISA pro-
tected pension plans.26 In addition, the ERISA state law preemption
20. When a person creates a spendthrift trust for his or her own benefit, however, creditors are
not generally barred from access to the funds. "[I]t is against public policy to permit a man to tie up
his own property in such a way that he can still enjoy it but can prevent his creditors from reaching
it." 2 A. Sco-r, supra note 3, at § 156.
21. Id. at § 152.1.
22. See infra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.
23. By "pay status" I mean that the funds are accessible to the debtor-employee. Absent a
spendthrift provision, presumably, retirement trusts were accessible by family members in the same
manner as other creditors. See 2 A. Scorr, supra note 3, at § 147.2.
24. Keller v. Keller, 284 I11. App. 198, 206, 1 N.E. 2d 773, 777 (1936) (support of children
transcends all contractual obligations); Safe Deposit & Trust of Baltimore v. Robertson, 192 Md.
653, 663, 65 A.2d 292, 246 (1949) (alimony is an obligation continuing during the joint lives of the
parties and is a duty not a debt). See also 2 A. Scorr, supra note 3, at § 157.1; Sherman, supra note
14, at 271.
25. See supra note 9.
26. Treas. Reg. 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (1978) provides:
(b) No assignment or alienation.
(1) General Rule. Under § 401(a)(13), a trust will not be qualified unless the plan of
which the trust is a part provides that benefits provided under the plan may not be antici-
pated, assigned (either at law or in equity), alienated or subject to attachment, garnish-
ment, levy, execution or other legal process.
ERISA § 3002(c) (29 U.S.C. § 1202(c)) allows the Secretary of Treasury to promulgate regulations
covering ERISA's minimum vesting, funding and participation standards. Section 206(d) is part of
ERISA's vesting standards. By virtue of this grant of authority, the Secretary of Treasury's regula-
tion interpreting I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) has been viewed as the controlling interpretation of ERISA
§ 206(d). In addition, I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) and ERISA § 206(d) are almost identical, leading courts
to conclude that the regulation is also an interpretation of ERISA § 206(d). Further, the Secretary's
authority granted in ERISA § 3002(c) is legislative in nature, giving the Treasury's regulations great
Washington University Open Scholarship
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provision, section 514(a),27 would seem to preempt the common law fam-
ily support provision, because, contrary to ERISA, the exception permit-
ted attachment of pension plan benefits.2" The inequity of preempting
this well-established exception led courts to develop a family exception to
section 206(d)(1). 29
Federal courts seized upon the language in section 2 of ERISA to find
that one of ERISA's purposes was to protect the employee's family.30
Courts further reasoned that ERISA was not intended to alter traditional
family support obligations.3 Federal courts almost unanimously upheld
state laws allowing garnishments to fulfill family support obligations
such as child support, alimony, and community property rights.32
C. Congress Responds: The Retirement Equity Act of 1984
The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 codified the family support excep-
tion to section 206(d)(1). 33 The statute requires a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order (Q.D.R.O.)34 as a condition precedent to benefit plan
weight. See Ellis Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville v. Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1986); Ten-
neco v. First Virginia Bank of Tidewater, 698 F.2d 688 (4th Cir. 1983); General Motors Corp. v.
Buha, 623 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1980); Note, ERISA and Tenneco: 4 One-Two Punch on Judgment
Creditors Garnisheeing Pension Accounts, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 556, 566 (1984) (discussing the
weight given to the Secretary's regulation).
27. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
28. General Motors v. Townsend, 468 F. Supp, 466 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (literal reading of ER-
ISA § 206(d) precludes an attachment of benefit plans for support of dependent family members).
29. Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), off'd, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980) (one
of the first cases to develop a family support exception to § 206(d)(1)).
30. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing § 2 of ERISA
as supporting an implied exception to § 206(d)(1) for the support and well-being of an employee's
family); Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 926, 930-31 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd., 632 F.2d 740 (9th
Cir. 1980) (members of an employee's family part of the class of people ERISA protects). See supra
note 2 (goals of ERISA).
31. Savings and Profit Sharing Fund of Sears Employees v. Gago, 717 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir.
1983) (ERISA interpreted not to preempt all conflicting state domestic relations law); Operating
Engineers Local 428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zamborsky, 650 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1981) (recognizing
that ERISA does not preempt obligations to pay alimony). See supra note 30.
32. See supra notes 30-31; G. BOREN, supra note 4, at § 2:13.
33. Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat 1433 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1986)). The family
support exception now appears in ERISA 206(d)(3)(A) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)). The
LtRC. parallel provision to § 206(d)(3)(A) is § 414(p)(1)-(13) (1986). The I.R.C. parallel provision
to ERISA § 206(d)(3)(A) allows the payment from pension funds in accord with a Qualified Domes-
tic Relations Order. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
34. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(A),(B) defines the Qualified Domestic Relations Order exception to
206(d)(1). § 206(d)(3)(A),(B) (29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(3)(A),(B)) provides:
(A) Paragraph (1) shall apply to the creation, assignment, or recognition of a right to any
benefit payable with respect to a participant pursuant to a domestic relations order, except
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss2/7
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fund access. A Q.D.R.O. is a court order, decree, or judgment for the
garnishment of benefit plan funds that assigns or recognizes ex-spouses'
or dependents' right to receive benefits, specifies the amount to be paid,
defines the payment period, and specifies other minor requirements.35
The legislative history to the Retirement Equity Act indicates that
Q.D.R.O.'s may only require payment up to the amount the employee is
entitled to under the pension plan.36 Further, the amendments provide
that state garnishment and attachment laws are not preempted so far as
they are used to enforce Q.D.R.O.'s.37
that paragraph (1) shall not apply if the order is determined to be a qualified domestic
relations order. Each pension plan shall provide for the payment of benefits in accordance
with the applicable requirements of any qualified domestic relations order.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph-
(i) the term "qualified domestic relations order" means a domestic relations order-
(I) which creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee's right to, or
assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits
payable with respect to a participant under a plan, and
(II) with respect to which the requirements of subparagraphs (C) and (D) are
met, and
(ii) the term "domestic relations order" means any judgment, decree, or order (in-
cluding approval of a property settlement agreement) which-
(I) relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital prop-
erty rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant,
and
(II) is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including a community
property law).
Id.
35. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(C),(D) provides:
(C) A domestic relations order meets the requirements of this subparagraph only if such
order clearly specifies-
(i) the name and the last known mailing address (if any) of the participant and the
name and mailing address of each alternate payee covered by the order,
(ii) the amount or percentage of the participant's benefits to be paid by the plan to
each such alternate payee, or the manner in which such amount or percentage is to be
determined,
(iii) the number of payments or period to which such order applies, and
(iv) each plan to which such order applies.
(D) A domestic relations order meets the requirements of this subparagraph only if such
order-
(i) does not require a plan to provide any type or form of benefit, or any option, not
otherwise provided under the plan,
(ii) does not require the plan to provide increased benefits (determined on the basis
of actuarial value), and
(iii) does not require the payment of benefits to an alternate payee which are re-
quired to be paid to another alternate payee under another order previously deter-
mined to be a qualified domestic relations order.
Id. See generally G. BOREN, supra note 4, at § 2:13.50 (discussing Q.D.R.O.'s.)
36. See, eg., G. BOREN, supra note 4, at § 2:13.50 n.8 (citing 2 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 858 (1986)).
37. See ERISA § 514(b)(7) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 11 14(b)(7)).
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III. CREDITORS' ACCESS TO EMPLOYEES' PENSION AND WELFARE
PLAN FUNDS
A. Pension Plan Access
An ERISA pension plan is an arrangement between an employer and
its employees creating or maintaining a fund to provide retirement in-
come for employees and must contain a restriction preventing alienation
or assignment of plan funds.38 ERISA section 206(d)(2), however, ex-
plicitly allows employees to make voluntary and revocable assignments
not exceeding ten percent of a benefit payment. 39 Also, section 206(d)(2)
allows employees to use nonforfeitable benefits as collateral for a loan.' °
The Fourth Circuit expressed the dominant interpretation of section
206(d)(1) in Tenneco, Inc. v. First Virginia Bank of Tidewater.4 The
court held that section 206(d)(1) bars garnishment, attachment, levy or
other legal process aimed at accessing pension benefits.a2 In Tenneco, a
significant portion of the funds in the employee's stock ownership and
thrift plans were payable to the employee at will. The court nonetheless
granted protection from judgment creditors. 43 The Fourth Circuit based
its reading of the statute on the Treasury Regulation implementing sec-
38. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Nonforfeitable benefits are those obtained by a
participant or his beneficiary by virtue of the participant's service and are unconditional and legally
enforceable against the plan. ERISA § 3(19) (29 U.S.C. 1002(19)).
41. 698 F.2d 688 (4th Cir. 1983).
42. Id. at 688-90. Barring creditors' access to funds payable at the will of the employee departs
from some of the law of spendthrift trusts. Historically, a trust created by a person for his or her
own benefit would not be protectable form creditors. See 2 A. ScoTr, supra note 3 at § 156. In
Tenneco, up to 75% of the employee's contributions to the plan were withdrawable at will when the
employment relationship ended or after two years of participation in the plan. 698 F.2d at 690.
Thus, the employee was able to tie up his own funds and enjoy them at will while his creditors went
unpaid. Commentators have considered this contrary to public policy; see supra note 19.
Aside from the Tenneco court's § 206(d) ruling, the Fourth Circuit's opinion arguably could be
read to hold by implication that pre-retirement withdrawal of pension funds are protected from
creditors for 60 days. During these 60 days the employee is given the opportunity to roll over the
money into another ERISA protected plan. Once the 60 days are over, however, the funds originat-
ing from a ERISA plan, and not rolled, over are subject to garnishment. 698 F.2d at 691. See also
I.R.C. § 403(a)(4) (1986).
43. The court stated that ERISA prohibits garnishment of pension plan benefits, despite the
method by which they are payable. Id. at 690. But see infra notes 127-43 and accompanying text
(discussion of bankruptcy courts' rulings that benefits freely accessible by an employee are not pro-
tected from creditors).
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tion 206(d)(1).' While section 206(d) only prohibits assignment or exe-
cution, the regulation in addition, prohibits levy and garnishment.'5 The
court, without explanation, adopted these additional restrictions finding
the regulation to be the controlling interpretation of section 206(d)(1)
because the secretary, in promulgating the regulation, did not abuse his
discretion.46
The majority of courts have adopted the implicit holding in Tenneco,'
that ERISA section 514(a) preempts state laws that allow creditors ac-
cess to pension benefits. 8 One district court has extended this reasoning
to allow preemption of a state law permitting a levy upon an ERISA
pension plan to pay state taxes.49
On the other hand one commentator, Professor Young, argues that the
Treasury Regulation incorrectly interprets ERISA's legislative history.5
Young argues that sections 206(d)(1) and (2) should be read to prevent
voluntary assignments of not more than ten percent of plan funds. In
addition, because garnishments and attachments are not voluntary, they
44. See supra note 26. The Secretary promulgated this regulation pursuant to his authority to
establish standards governing several sections of ERISA, including § 206(d).
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-(13)(b)(1).(1978). See supra note 26 (text of regulation).
46. 698 F.2d at 689-90. Implicit in the court's holding is the belief that the Treasury did not
abuse its discretion in promulgating the Regulations. As a general rule, regulations promulgated
pursuant to a statutory grant of authority have legislative effect as long the regulation is not an abuse
of discretion. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977). See Helvering v. Winmill 305 U.S. 79,
83 (1938) ("[t]reasury regulations and interpretations long continued without substantial change,
applying to an unamended or substantially reenacted statutes, are deemed to have received congres-
sional approval and have the effect of law."). See also supra note 26.
47. See, e.g., United Metal Products Corp. v. National Bank of Detroit, 811 F.2d 297, 300 (6th
Cir. 1987); Ellis Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville v. Irving Trust, 786 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1986) (§ 206(d)(1)
bars garnishment of funds in a pension plan wrongfully acquired by the employee); General Motors
Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 462 (6th Cir. 1980) (ERISA bars garnishment of qualified pension
funds); Commercial Mortgage Ins., Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 526 F. Supp. 510, 520
(N.D. Tex. 1981).
48. The court ruled that garnishments, attachments, levies and other state procedures directed
towards accessing pension funds were prohibited by ERISA § 206(d)(1). This reasoning is similar to
that found in the Supreme Court's decision in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504
(1981) (state law prohibiting what ERISA explicitly allows is preempted). See supra note 12 (text of
ERISA § 514(a)); Note, ERISA and Tenneco: A One-Two Punch on Judgment Creditors Garnishee-
ing Pension Accounts 41 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 556, 563 (1984).
49. Northwest Airlines Inc. v. Roemer, 603 F. Supp. 7, 9-10 (D. Minn. 1986) (ERISA § 206(d)
implicitly indicates Congress' intent to preempt a state's authority to levy on an ERISA protected
pension plan).
50. S. YOUNG, PENSION AND PROFIT-SHARING PLANS § 13.03 (1987).
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should not generally be prevented by section 206(d)(1)."' Professor
Young's argument must be based on a belief that the Treasury Secretary
acted either arbitrarily or capriciously, or abused his discretion in
promulgating the Regulations. 2
The Eleventh Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit, however,
have recognized one exception to Tenneco.53 According to these courts,
section 206(d)(1) does not bar access to ERISA pension benefits when
the employee-debtor obtained the funds through wrongdoing against the
employer. In St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Cox 4 the Elev-
enth Circuit held that ERISA does not preempt the equitable principle
that a person should not benefit from his wrongful acquisition of funds.55
51. This reasoning is based on ERISA's legislative history contained in H.R. REP. No. 93-1280,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 280 reprinted in ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13 at 4547.
However, the plan may provide that after a benefit is in pay status, there may be a volun-
tary revocable assignment (not to exceed 10 percent of any benefit payment) by an em-
ployee which is not for purposes of defraying the administrative costs of the plan. For
purposes of this rule, a garnishment or levy is not to be considered a voluntary assignment.
Id.
In S. YOUNG, supra note 50, at § 13.03, the author asserts that the second sentence in the above
quote merely defines what is not a voluntary assignment in connection with the preceding sentence.
The author further states that ERISA's anti-assignment rule (§ 206(d)(1)) does not prevent garnish-
ments or levies generally. Id.
A line of New York cases support Young's argument. See, eg., National Bank of North America
v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 3, 69 A.D. 2d 679, 419 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1979) (state law
allowing judgment creditor to garnish property of judgment debtor neither in conflict nor preempted
by ERISA); Pepitone v. Pepitone, 108 Misc. 2d 12, 436 N.Y.S.2d 966 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (ERISA
does not immunize pension payments from family support obligations); Plymouth Rock Fuel Corp.
v. Bank of New York, 102 Misc. 2d 235, 425 N.Y.S.2d 908 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (statutory prohibi-
tion of assignments of plans did not exempt Keogh plan from garnishment by judgment creditors).
More recent New York cases, however, appear to adopt the approach of the Fourth Circuit in Ten-
neco. See, eg., Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v. Winter, 74 A.D.2d 195, 426 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1980), aff'd. 52
N.Y.S.2d 984, 438 N.Y.S.2d 79, 419 N.E. 2d 1078 (1981) (Appellate Division, First Department
refused to follow the Appellate Division, Second Department's ruling in National Bank); Long Is-
land Jewish Hillside Medical Center v. Prendergast, 134 Misc.2d 93, 509 N.Y.S.2d 697 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1986) (Court of Appeals affirmance of Helmsley-Spear means, by implication, the court over-
ruled National Bank).
52. Because the Secretary promulgated the regulation pursuant to a congressional grant of au-
thority, a rejection of the regulation's provisions implies that it was improperly promulgated. See
supra notes 26, 46. See also General Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 462-63 (6th Cir. 1980)
(appropriate standard of review for rejecting the Treasury Regulation interpreting ERISA § 206(d),
and its companion, I.R.C. § 401(a)(13), is abuse of discretion).
53. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550, 551-52 (11th Cir. 1985); Crawford
v. La Boucherie Bernard, Ltd., 815 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
54. 752 F.2d 550 (11th Cir. 1985).
55. Id. at 552. The court focused on the financial security of other employees, noting that
garnishment of funds wrongfully accumulated from the employer financially stabilizes the employer,
and thus, stabilizes the pension plan. Id.
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Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit, in Crawford v. La Bouchiere
Bernard, Ltd.,56 allowed access to pension plan assets of participants who
were fiduciaries of the plan, because the fiduciaries wrongfully acquired
pension funds at the expense of the other participants.57
In Ellis National Bank of Jacksonville v. Irving Trust Co.,58 however,
the Second Circuit held the "criminal misconduct" exception to preemp-
tion in St. Paul Fire contrary to the basic purpose of ERISA, and refused
to adopt it.59 The court reasoned that Congress' primary objective was
to ensure that an employee receive his benefits on retirement, once that
individual had fulfilled the necessary prerequisites.' In addition, the
court stated that allowing access to wrongfully accumulated funds would
undermine the stability of pension plans because it creates an uncertainty
of receiving promised benefits.6"
Preemption of state attachment and garnishment of ERISA pension
benefits as implied in Tenneco and asserted Ellis National Bank presents
a problem when the employee-debtor is self-employed or voluntarily con-
tributes to his or her employer's sponsored plan. In such situations ER-
ISA's protection of pension plan funds may be abused in order to defeat
creditors. At common law, many courts held that a debtor could not
create a trust for his own benefit and prevent access to it by creditors.62
The courts maintained that public policy prohibited a person from en-
joying his own property, yet preventing creditors from reaching it.63 The
IRS recognized this type of problem when it adopted a regulation that
disqualifies a qualified pension plan from tax breaks if the contributions
to the plan amount to more than ten percent of the employee's earn-
56. 815 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
57. Id. at 121-22. "A contrary interpretation would permit trustee wrongdoers to benefit from
their misdeeds at the expense of those who ERISA was designed to protect." Id.
58. 786 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1986).
59. Id. at 471. See also United Metal Products v. National Bank of Detroit, 811 F.2d 297 (6th
Cir. 1987) (no criminal misconduct exception to § 206(d)(1) because only Congress may create
exceptions).
60, 786 F.2d at 471. See also Vink v. SHV North American Holding Corp., 549 F. Supp 268
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v. Winter, 74 A.D. 195, 426 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1st Dep't 1980),
aff'd., 52 N.Y.2d 984, 438 N.Y.S.2d 79, 419 N.E.2d 1078 (1981).
61. 786 F.2d at 471-72. The court explicitly disagreed with the holding in St. Paul Fire that
ERISA's purpose outweighs general principles of equity. Id. See Note, Weakening ERISA's Pre-
emptive Powers: St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Cox Creates An Implied Exception to the
Anti-Alienation Provision for Employee Fraud, 6 VA. TAX L. REV. 185 (1986) (arguing that ERISA
preempts actions seeking wrongfully acquired employer funds placed in an employee's ERISA plan).
62. See generally A. ScoTT, supra note 3, at § 156. See also Sherman, supra note 14 at 261.
63. Id.
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ings.6 This limit indicates that the IRS considers contributions over the
ten percent limit to take undue advantage of the more favorable tax
treatment.
Absolute preemption of state law allows an employee or sole proprie-
tor to place a large percentage of income into ERISA protected pension
plans, whether or not the plans qualify for tax breaks. 6 In addition, the
Fourth Circuit in Tenneco stated that funds accessible at will by an em-
ployee were protected by section 206(d)(1). 66 ERISA's broad preemp-
tion of state common law, therefore, allows an employee to shield more
earnings than required for retirement support. As the amount of money
protected increases, so does the likelihood that creditors may go
unpaid.67
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Tenneco continues the trend towards
barring any access to pension benefits.6" The benefit of this trend is that
it provides consistent treatment of creditors rights to the benefits. On the
other hand, the Second Circuit's decision in Ellis National Bank overex-
tends Tenneco's rationale. That decision may give employees a legal ex-
pectation in funds they wrongfully accumulated at their employers'
expense. 69 The Eleventh Circuit in St. Paul Fire and the D.C. Circuit in
Crawford present a more common sense view of Tenneco, applying it to
protect only funds legally accumulated by employees.70
Universal preemption of state law governing the garnishment of pen-
sion benefits, provides a method to avoid creditors and is, therefore, not
equitable. Recognizing that a gap exists in ERISA's coverage in this
area, federal courts could avoid this result by adopting a cut-off for vol-
untary contributions similar to the one employed by the IRS. 7, Any
64. G. BOREN, supra note 4 at § 1:13 (citing Rev. Rul. 80-350, 1980-82 GB 133); Sherman,
supra note 14 at 264 § 264 n.77 (citing Rev. Rul. 59-185, 1959-ICB 86). The limit prevents contri-
butions motivated solely for tax avoidance. Rev. Rul. 80-350, 1980-82 CB 133,133.
65. ERISA governs all pension plans, and subjects most of them to disclosure, funding, report-
ing and vesting requirements. Therefore, an employee's funds may not receive tax breaks yet ERISA
will govern and protect the funds. There are several exceptions to ERISA's governance of pension
plans. See Sherman supra note 14 at 248 n.8. (listing twelve exceptions).
66. 698 F.2d at 690. See supra note 43.
67. Sherman, supra note 14 at 261-71 (discussing problems with ERISA protection of funds
donated in excess of what is needed upon retirement).
68. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
71. This proposal is discussed in Sherman, supra note 14, at 264-65. He argues that adopting
the ten percent cut off protects those contributions made for a protectable purpose and allows access
to funds not necessary for retirement. Id. See also supra, note 64 and accompanying text. However,
[Vol. 67:461
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss2/7
1989] ERISA AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS
amount an employee contributes over the limit would be accessible to
creditors. This proposal is more equitable with regards to debtor-credi-
tor relations, than universal preemption for access to pension plan funds.
Further, the limit allows a significant portion of voluntary contributors
to be protected by ERISA, fulfilling ERISA's purpose.7 2 Such a provi-
sion might require special consideration to avoid the undue burden on
sole proprietors, who would require a higher limit to offset other employ-
ees' advantage.73
B. Access to Welfare Plan Benefits
Employee welfare plans are not explicitly included in section
206(d)(1).74 Prior to 1988, three views existed concerning access to an
employee welfare plan by a creditor.75  First, the Missouri Supreme
Court, in Electrical Workers Credit Union v. IBEW-NECA Holiday Trust
Fund, held that states may decide for themselves whether to allow ac-
cess.7 6 Second, the Ninth Circuit, in Franchise Tax Board v. Construc-
tion Workers Vacation Trust Fund, held that ERISA's underlying policy
implicitly bars creditors' access to welfare plan benefits.77  Finally, the
Georgia Supreme court, in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency, held that
the author does not discuss under what authority such a cut off would be implemented. Clearly,
when enacting ERISA, Congress envisioned that a federal common law of pensions would develop
to fill in the gaps. See supra note 13-14. Arguably, Congress did not completely address creditors
rights and thus courts should fill in the gap. See supra note 14. The cut off would have to limit
contributions to a certain percentage of an employee's yearly income. The IRS allows contributions
not exceeding ten percent of "an employee's agregate compensation for all years since the employee
became a participant thereunder." (Rev. Rul 80-350, 1980-82 CB 133,133). Obviously, in the
debtor-creditor area the limit could not be easily applied in an agregate manner.
72. See supra note 2.
73. Sole proprietors require a higher cut off limit because all of their contributions to a self-
sponsored pension plan are voluntary. Limiting those contributions to ten percent of their gross
income would put sole proprietors at a disadvantage vis-a-vis corporate-sponsored plans. Sherman,
supra note 14, at 270-71.
74. See supra note 9.
75. This conflict arose because of courts' divergent interpretations of § 514(a) of ERISA which
preempts state laws "relating to" ERISA benefit plans.
76. 583 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. 1979). For cases that follow this approach, see Vacation Trust Fund
v. Local Union 212 IBEW, Credit Union, 549 F. Supp. 1299, 1300-02 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (no implied
restriction upon the alienation and assignment of welfare plan funds), aff'd 735 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir.
1984); MISIC v. Building Serv. Employees Health, 789 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1986) (allowing
assignment of health care reimbursements); Arizona Laborers, Local 395, Pension Trust Fund v.
Nevarez, 661 F. Supp. 365, 368-70 (D. Ariz. 1987) (Congress only provided specific protection re-
garding pension funds and did not provide protection regarding welfare plans).
77. 679 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir.), vacated, 463 U.S. 1 (1983) (vacated for lack of jurisdiction).
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states may not bar access to welfare plan funds.78
The Supreme Court in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency, Inc. ,71 re-
solved this conflict by holding that a state may not explicitly exempt ER-
ISA plans from state garnishment laws."0 The Court also held that
Congress did not intend ERISA "to forbid the use of state-law mecha-
nisms of executing judgments against ERISA welfare benefit plans, even
when those mechanisms prevent plan participants from receiving their
benefits.""1 The result of the Mackey case is that any state with a law
allowing attachment, garnishment or levy must allow such access to ER-
ISA welfare plans. The Court recognized that ERISA allows attachment
of plan funds through state law procedures with regard to suits to enforce
a participant's rights under a particular plan.82 Further, the Court rec-
ognized that ERISA plans also may be sued for "run-of-the-mill" state-
law claims.83 Judgments received in such suit are enforceable through
state-law procedures, including attachment.8 4 By analogy, the Court rea-
soned that attachment of an individual's welfare plan funds to enforce a
judgment against the individual is equally allowable; such an action does
not "relate to" an ERISA plan. 5
In support of its analogy, the Court pointed out that ERISA section
206(d)(1) bars attachment only of an individual's pension plan funds.8 6
Therefore, Congress' preclusion of garnishments of an individual's plan
funds extends only to pension plan funds.8 7 Thus, if ERISA section
78. 350 S.E.2d 439 (Ga. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988).
79. 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988).
80. Id. at 2184-85, 2191. The Court also preempted a Georgia law that specifically barred
garnishments of ERISA plan funds. The Court held that state law that applied solely to ERISA
plans "relates to" ERISA plans and was thus, preempted by § 514(a). Id. at 2185.
81. Id. at 2191.
82. 108 S. Ct. at 2186-87. Section 502 of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1132), allows an ERISA plan to
sue and be sued by a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due under the plan. Section
502(d)(2), (29 U.S.C. § 1 132(d)(2)), further provides that money judgments are enforceable against
plans as entities.
83. 108 S. Ct. at 2187 n.8. Such claims include those for unpaid rent, failure to pay creditors,
and torts committed by ERISA plans. Id.
84. Id. at 2187 n.9.
85. Id. at 2188. "[Tlhere is simply no logical way to construe the English language so that
garnishment or attachment laws 'relate to' benefit plans when they are invoked by creditors of the
beneficiaries, but not when they are invoked by beneficiaries or creditors of the [plan] itself." Id.
(quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below at 24).
86. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency, 108 S. Ct. at 2183-84.
87. Id. at 2188. "Where Congress intended in ERISA to preclude a particular method of state-
law enforcement of judgments, or extend anti-alienation protection to a particular type of ERISA
plan, it did so expressly in the statute." Id.
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514(a) is allowed to preempt garnishments of all ERISA plan funds, sec-
tion 206(d)(1) would be redundant."
Finally, the Court dismissed the argument that because the Retirement
Equity Act of 1984 allow Q.D.R.O.'s to garnish an individual's welfare
plan funds, 9 Congress never intended to allow garnishments of an indi-
vidual's welfare plan funds generally.'
In dissent, Justice Kennedy opined that "state garnishment laws neces-
sarily relate to employee benefit plans to the extent they require such
plans to act as garnishees, which is a substantial and onerous obliga-
tion." Therefore, ERISA preempts such laws with regard to an indi-
vidual's welfare plan funds.92 The dissent noted that Congress intended
section 514(a)'s broad reach to encompass state laws specifically pre-
empted by other provisions of ERISA.93 Thus, section 514(a)'s mere re-
dundancy with section 206(d)(1) should not bar its ability to preempt
state garnishment laws as they relate to ERISA welfare plans.94 In addi-
tion the dissent argued that garnishment of an individual's plan funds
forces the plan to be a garnishee and would have a significant effect on
the administration of the plan.95
The Court is correct in not extending section 206(d)(1)'s protection to
welfare plans. 96 Both opinions fail, however, to recognize the fundamen-
tal difference between welfare and pension plans. Equating the two ig-
nores the fact that pension plans play a more vital role in an employee's
future security than do welfare plans. ERISA's greater protection of
pension plan funds is indicative of congressional recognition of this
point. 97 Pensions deserve greater protection from disbursement before
retirement. 98 In addition, vacation or holiday trusts merely defer wages
88, Id. at 2189.
89. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
90. 108 S. Ct. at 2189-91. The Court explained that Congress enacted the 1984 Amendments to
remedy erroneously decided court cases on the issue, and to clarify the original meaning of §§ 206(d)
and 514(a). Id.
91. Id. at 2192.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2194.
94. Id. at 2193-94.
95. Id. at 2193.
96. Nowhere in § 206(d) is the term welfare plan or benefit plan used. The section speaks only
of assignment and alienation of pension plan benefits. See supra note 9.
97. ERISA only subjects pension plans to its participation and vesting and funding require-
ments. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-86.
98. See, eg., Local Union 212 Vacation Trust Fund v. Local Union 212 Credit Union, 549 F.
Supp. 1299 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (Congress did not view welfare plans as so vital to employees' financial
1989]
Washington University Open Scholarship
476 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 67:461
and do not serve the purpose of generating future employee income
through long-term investments. Allowing creditors' access to welfare
plan funds does not hamper the fulfillment of the public policy of pro-
tecting employees' future financial stability.99
One can make the following observations regarding the preemption of
state garnishment laws by section 514(a). The Supreme Court in a recent
case on ERISA preemption, Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, c °
upheld a state law requiring a one-time severance payment to be made by
employers. 01 The Court reasoned that the severance law did not regu-
late an ERISA plan, because the law did not interfere with the em-
ployer's ability to operate its plan in a uniform manner.102 Similarly, a
state law allowing garnishment of vested welfare plan funds merely alters
the distribution of the benefits, 3 and does not affect the employer's abil-
ity to uniformly administer ERISA's disclosure, funding, reporting, vest-
ing or enforcement of benefit plan provisions. ° Thus, under the
rationale of Fort Halifax Packing, section 514(a) does not preempt state
garnishment laws because ERISA does not govern the payment of bene-
fits except for specifying the date by which payments must be made.'05
stability that plans should be protected from creditors), aff'd, 735 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir. 1984); Ari-
zona Laborers, Local 395 Pension Trust Fund v. Nevarez, 661 F. Supp. 365, 370 (D. Ariz. 1987) (no
indicating in ERISA's legislative history of concern for protecting welfare plan funds form
creditors).
99. A reading of the congressional declaration of policy for ERISA clearly indicates that Con-
gress' concern was for the financial stability and well-being of employees and their families. Al-
lowing the garnishment of vacation or holiday funds does not offend this concern. See supra note 2.
100. 107 S. Ct. 2211 (1987).
101. Id. at 2223.
102. Id. at 2219. The Court stated the state law did not in any way create "the potential for the
type of conflicting regulation of benefit plans that ERISA preemption was intended to concern." Id.
103. When vacation or holiday benefits are vested at the end of each fiscal year, employers calcu-
late how much vacation or holiday pay an employee is to receive. Thus, a garnishment of vested
vacation or holiday pay will only require the plan administrator to pay the creditor a percentage of
the calculated benefits pursuant to a court judgment. See Electrical Workers Local No. 1 Credit
Union v. IBEW-NECA Holiday Trust Fund, 583 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. 1979) (holiday benefits calcu-
lated as a fixed percentage of total hours worked per year and were calculated at the end of the year).
104. See Martori Bros. Distributors v. James-Massengale, 781 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1986). In that
case, the court stated that the principle underlying all of the ERISA preemption decisions appears to
be that the state law is preempted by § 514(a) "if... it regulates the matters regulated by ERISA:
disclosure, funding, reporting, vesting, and enforcement of benefit pals. Id. at 1357-58 (citations
omitted).
105. ERISA § 206(a) (29 U.S.C. § 206(d)) governs only the commencement date for payments
of benefits.
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IV. BANKRUPTCY CREDITORS' ACCESS TO BENEFIT PLAN FUNDS
A. Introduction
While judgment creditors, as shown above, excluding family members,
may not reach an employee's pension plan funds, they are not entirely
without recourse. A majority of courts have held that the Bankruptcy
Code (Code) 1"6 does not protect benefit plan funds from access by credi-
tors.10 7 This result allows creditors, through Chapter 7 of the Code, to
circumvent ERISA section 206(d)(1) waiting until the debtor voluntarily
declares bankruptcy or even forcing the debtor into bankruptcy.'08 One
commentator has characterized this result as a clash of social policies.109
ERISA's purpose is to protect retirement funds to ensure employees will
receive their expected benefits at retirement. 110 The Code, however, has
the dual purpose of reimbursing creditors to the greatest extent possible,
while also rehabilitating debtors.1 1
There are two primary means by which an employee-debtor can pro-
tect his benefit funds from bankruptcy creditors. First, a creditor can be
barred from access to benefit funds if the debtor's interests and rights in
the funds are excluded from the debtor's bankruptcy estate pursuant to
section 541(c)(2) of the Code. 12 If the debtor's rights and interests are
so excluded, they are not available to satisfy bankruptcy creditors be-
cause they never enter the bankruptcy estate." 3 Second, a debtor can
deny a creditor access to benefit plan funds if the debtor can exempt
totally or partially his rights and interests in benefit plans pursuant to
section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Code.114 An exemption bars access to funds
that are included in the bankruptcy estate. This Note examines each of
these avenues in turn below.
106. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-151, 326 (1978)).
107. See infra notes 120-126.
108. Chapter 7 of the Code requires that the debtor's assets be turned over to the creditors to pay
as much of the debtor's liabilities as possible. This Note will only address Chapter 7 because Chap-
ters 11 and 13 address supervised reorganization to pay creditors without liquidation and, therefore,
have no application here.
109. Wohl, Pension and Bankruptcy Laws: A Clash of Social Policies, 64 N.C.L. REv. 3 (1985).
110. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
111. See Wohl, supra note 109, at 5 n.8 (citing Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913)).
112. The bankruptcy estate "consists, essentially, of every kind of interest in property possessed
by the debtor prior to bankruptcy; the term 'property' is to be given it widest and most expansive
meaning." Id. at 11-12.
113. See infra notes 115-33 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 137-49 and accompanying text.
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B. Exclusion of ERISA Benefit Plans Under Section 541 (c) (1), (2).
Section 541(c)(1)(A) of the Code provides that except as specified in
section 541(c)(2), "any provision" that restrains alienation of property of
the debtor is ineffective in bankruptcy.115 On the other hand, section
541(c)(2) excludes from the bankruptcy estate interest in a trust in which
restraints on the interests therein are enforceable under "applicable non-
bankruptcy law.""' 6 Courts have created three different interpretations
of whether a debtor's interest in an ERISA protected plan may be ex-
cluded from the estate.' 1 7
In In re Goff the Fifth Circuit expressed the majority view," 8 holding
that section 541(c)(2) does not include ERISA as applicable non-bank-
ruptcy law. Hence, ERISA section 206(d)(1)'s restriction in a pension
plan accessible at will by the employee-debtor does not exclude the plan
from the bankruptcy estate.' The Goff court and others with the same
view of section 541(c)(2) find support for their view in three areas of the
Code.
First, these courts interpreted the legislative history of section
541(c)(2) to show that Congress intended applicable non-bankruptcy law
115. Section 541 (11 U.S.C. § 541) entitled "Property of the Estate" provides in pertinent part:
(a) The commencement of a case under § 301, 302 or 303 of this title creates an estate.
Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.
(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, an interest of the debtor in
property becomes property of the estate under subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(5) of this
section not with standing any provision...
(A) that restricts or conditions transfer of such interest by the debtor; or
(B) that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor, on the
commencement of a case under this title, or on the appointment of or the taking pos-
session by a trustee in a case under this title of a custodian, and that effects or gives an
option to effect a forfeiture, modification, or termination of the debtor's interest in
property.
(2) A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title.
116. See supra note 115.
117. See In re Dagnall, 78 Bankr. 531 (C.D. Ill. 1987) (brief discussion of the three interpreta-
tions); Seiden, Chapter 7 Cases: Do ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code Conflict as to Whether a
Debtor's Interest in or Rights Under a Qualified Plan Can Be Used to Pay Claims, 61 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 219 (1987) (discussing in depth the conflicts between ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code).
118. 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983).
119. Id. The pension plan involved was a Keogh Plan. Such plans are retirement plans for the
self-employed. Access to the funds is allowable at will, but at the expense of losing tax breaks. See
Wohl, supra note 109, at 110. See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Goff court's analysis of the Bankruptcy Code's § 522(b)(2)(A).
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to exempt from the bankruptcy estate only traditional spendthrift
trusts.12° Specifically, these courts assert ERISA is not applicable non-
bankruptcy law because ERISA section 206(d) merely requires non-
alienation and non-assignment of the funds, and allows the beneficiary-
employee to reach the entire amount at will. On the other hand, spend-
thrift trusts only dole out a percentage to the beneficiary, who has no
control over the additional sums.121 Second, section 522(b)(2)(A) of the
Code allows debtors to choose either state or federal bankruptcy law to
protect certain interests in property. If a state scheme is chosen, the pro-
vision permits debtors to exempt certain property under "other federal
law".12 Significantly, the legislative history to section 522(b)(2)(A) pro-
vides an illustrative list of federal laws that would exempt property under
that section, yet does not include ERISA. 123 Thus, if the legislative his-
tory to section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Code explicitly omits ERISA from its
list, then section 541(c)(2) hardly would include it by implication.124
Lastly, these courts rely heavily on the requirement in ERISA section
514(a) that ERISA is not to affect the operation of other federal laws.' 25
In addition, excluding benefit plans from the bankruptcy estate contra-
120. See In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352, 1360 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488, 1490
(11th Cir. 1985); In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Dagnall, 78 Bankr. 531, 533 (C.D.
Ill. 1987).
121. The court in Goff stated:
In general terms a spendthrift trust is a trust created to provide a fund for the maintenance
of a beneficiary, with only a certain portion of the total amount to be distributed at any one
time. The settlor places 'spendthrift' restrictions on the trust, which operate in most states
to place the fund beyond the reach of the beneficiary's creditors, as well as to secure the
fund against the beneficiary's own improvidence. 706 F.2d at 580.
See also In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352, 1360 (9th Cir. 1985) ("'applicable nonbankruptcy law' refers
only to state spendthrift trust law" and not broad reference to all other laws, including ERISA); In
re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488, 1490 (11th Cir. 1985) (applicable nonbankruptcy law only relates to
state spendthrift law). In re West, 64 Bankr. 738, 742 (D.Utah 1986) ("There will be instances
where ERISA plans will be included in the estate because they do not qualify as enforceable spend-
thrift trusts under state law, either because that state does not enforce spendthrift provisions or
because the provision is invalid.").
122. See infra note 138.
123. ERISA was enacted four years prior to the new Bankruptcy Code, and was also mentioned
specifically in § 522. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E)(iii). See In re Goff, 706 F.2d at 585 (Congress did
not "overlook" ERISA in illustrative list.).
124. In re Goff, 706 F.2d at 582-86. The petitioner debtors in that case claimed only that the
§ 541(c)(2) "other applicable bankruptcy law" provision included ERISA-quaified Keogh plans.
Even though they had chosen the state bankruptcy route, petitioner's did not alternatively assert that
§ 522(b)(2)(A)'s "federal law" exemption did so as well. Nonetheless, the court found it instructive
to make the comparison on its own. Id. at 582. Accord In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352, 1360-61 (9th
Cir. 1985); In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488, 1490-91 (11th Cir. 1985).
125. ERISA § 541(d) (29 U.S.C. § 1144(d)) provides in part: "Nothing in this title shall be
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dicts the Code's policy of broad inclusion of property in bankruptcy
estates. 1
26
A line of Bankruptcy Court cases directly conflict with Goff and its
progeny by holding that ERISA is applicable non-bankruptcy law. In In
Re Threewit, 27 the court held that because section 541(c)(2) does not
expressly use the term "spendthrift trust," no reason exists to give that
section such a narrow reading. 128 Thus, section 541(c)(2) should extend
to all pensions to bar creditors from reaching the employee's interest. 129
The court further reasoned that "under the plain and simple language of
section 541(c)(2), if the ERISA anti-alienation provisions are enforceable
against general creditors, they are enforceable against the bankruptcy
trustee." 13
0
Responding to the argument that section 522(d)(10)(E) of the Code"3 ,
expressly governs the exemption of pensions from the bankruptcy estates,
the Threewit court recognized that section 522(d)(10)(E) includes retire-
ment plans governed as well as not governed by ERISA. Therefore, the
court maintained that section 541(c)(2) is applicable only to pensions
governed by ERISA.'1 2 In addition, section 522(d)(10)(E) exempts only
the amount "reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor," while
541(c)(2) excludes the entire pension if it is ERISA governed, and thus
construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supercede any law of the United States,...
or any rule or regulation issued under any such law."
126. 706 F.2d at 586-87. The court stated that ERISA § 206(d)(1) does not, by itself, exclude
pensions from the bankruptcy estate. In addition, the policy of the Code is to broaden the property
of the estate available to bankruptcy creditors. Therefore, if ERISA were considered "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" under § 541(c)(1), this would frustrate the operation of federal bankruptcy law
and ERISA § 541(a). Id.
127. 24 Bankr. 927 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982).
128. Id. at 929. See also In re Ralstin, 61 Bankr. 502 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986); Lisciski v. Mosley,
42 Bankr. 181 (D.N.J. 1984); Warren v. G.M. Scott & Sons, 34 Bankr. 543 (S.D. Ohio 1983). Sei-
den, supra note 117, at 236-40. But see In re Matteson, 58 Bankr. 909, 910 (D. Colo. 1986)
(§ 541(c)(2) must be read to exclude only spendthrift trusts enforceable under state law).
129. 24 Bankr. at 929. The court reasoned that because "spendthrift trust" appears only in the
legislative history to § 541(c)(2) and not in the language of the section, the term should not be used
as a term of art. Instead, "spendthrift trust" should be given its ordinary meaning as inclusive of any
trust barring creditors' access to the beneficiary's interest. Id. (quoting 76 AM. JUR.2D Unemploy-
ment Compensation § 148, at 389 (1975)).
130. 24 Bankr. at 929. See also supra note 126.
131. This section allows a debtor to exempt from the estate payments made from the employee
benefit plans. See infra notes 137-149 and accompanying text.
132. 24 Bankr. at 929-30. The court stated that simply because § 552(d)(10)(E) and § 541(c)(2)
overlap, § 541(c)(2) is not prevented from excluding ERISA funds from the estate.
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inaccessible by general creditors.1 33
A third line of cases holds that all ERISA qualified pension plans are
part of the bankruptcy estate. 134 These courts reason that because sec-
tion 522(d) of the Code already includes an exception for certain pen-
sions, section 541(c)(2) was not intended to exclude other pensions from
the estate. 135 In addition, these cases find a congressional intent in sec-
tion 541(c)(2)'s legislative history not to exclude exclusively ERISA gov-
erned benefit interests from the bankruptcy estate.1
3 6
C. ERISA Benefit Plans and the Bankruptcy Code's
Exemption Scheme
If the debtor-employee fails to exclude his or her benefit plan from the
bankruptcy estate, then the debtor still may be able to bar creditors'
claims to the funds through section 522 of the Code. An exemption
under section 522 operates differently from an exclusion of an interest in
property under section 541: the interests excluded in section 541 never
enter the bankruptcy estate, while interests under section 522 are within
the estate but entirely or partially exempt from creditors' claims. 137 The
debtor may choose to exempt his or her benefit plan by virtue of section
133. The court noted these two characteristics, but did not connect them to create a logical
distinction. Id. at 929-30. See also Lisciski v. Mosley, 42 Bankr. 181 (D.N.J. 1984); Warren v. G.M.
Scott & Sons, 34 Bankr. 543 (S.D. Ohio 1983). But see In re Di Piazza, 29 Bankr. 916, 921 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (criticizing In re Threewit).
134. See In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268, 1272-73 (8th Cir. 1984) ("A debtor's interest in pension
funds first comes into the bankruptcy estate to the extent they are needed for a fresh start they may
then be exempted out."). See also Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 1981) (legislative history
to § 541(c)(2) unambiguously indicates that pension funds are not excluded from Chapter 13 es-
tates); In re Flygstad, 56 Bankr. 884, 887 (N.D. Iowa 1986) (§ 541(a)(1) includes pension funds in
the estate, precluding examination of provisions of a pension plan to determine if it is a valid spend-
thrift trust); In re McKenna, 58 Bankr. 221 (N.D. Iowa 1985) ("Graham mandates that a debtor's
interest in an ERISA plan is to be included in the estate.").
135. See Graham, 726 F.2d at 1271-73; Regan 691 F.2d at 85-86. The impact of the courts'
reliance § 541(c)(2)'s legislative history is unclear. The courts cite to H.R. No. 595, 95th Cong. 1st
Sess. 175-76, 364 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6136, 6325, which
states that § 541(c)(2) preserves restrictions on transfers in a spendthrift trust if the trust is enforcea-
ble under applicable nonbankruptcy law. The Graham and Regan courts, however, do not look to
applicable state law, but rather conclude that § 541(c)(2) was not intended to keep all of a debtor's
ERISA plan benefits out of the bankruptcy estate. Graham, 726 F.2d at 1272, Regan, 691 F.2d at
85-86. But see In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985); In re McLean, 762 F.2d 1204 (4th
Cir. 1985) (declining to follow Graham, holding applicable nonbankruptcy law to determine a plan's
proper inclusion in the estate).
136. Graham, 726 F.2d at 1272-73; In re McKenna, 58 Bankr. 221, 223 (N.D. Iowa 1985).
137. See Wohl, supra note 109, at 24-28 (discussing the workings of the bankruptcy exemptions
in § 522). See also supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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522(d)'s "federal exemption" scheme, or the debtor may use the law of
the state in which he or she is a citizen.' 3 "
Section 522(d) lists the exemptions available to a debtor who uses the
federal exemption scheme. Section 522(d)(10)(E) allows the debtor-em-
ployee to exempt payments by employee benefit plans, but only to the
"extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any de-
pendents of the debtor."' 139 One commentator asserts that the primary
method of determining what is "reasonably necessary" is to ensure that
the presumed future earnings combined with some amount of funds in
the exempted benefit plans will allow the debtor to "sustain basic needs
upon retirement."'" Several courts, however, have characterized the
purpose of the Code as ensuring only the fresh start of the debtor, not
future financial stability. These courts, thus, refuse to exempt pension
plan funds.'' Thus in some jurisdictions, creditors may gain access to
138. The federal exemption scheme exempts property "recognized as necessary for ordinary life
.. " 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 522.02 (L. King 15th ed. 1987) [hereinafter COLLIER]
The exemption provision of Bankruptcy Code § 522 provides in pertinent part:
(b) Notwithstanding § 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt from property of the
estate either-
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless the State law that is
applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(a) of this subsection specifically does not so au-
thorize; or, in the alternative,
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal Law, other than subsection (d) of this section,
or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition at the place in
which the debtor's domicile has been located for 180 days immediately preceding the date of the
filing of the petition...
(d) The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(1) of this section:
(10) The debtor's right to receive-
(E) a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or
contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to the extent
reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor..
11 U.S.C. § 522 (1986). Most states require use of the state's bankruptcy exemption by its citizens.
See 7 COLLIER, supra note 138, at I n.6 (listing the 35 states that have opted-out of the federal
bankruptcy exemptions).
139. See supra note 138.
140. Wohl, supra note 109, at 25-26.
141. See In re Clark, 711 F.2d 21, 23 (3d Cir. 1983), in which the court states that: "[t]he
exemption of present Keogh payments, to the extent they are necessary for the support of the debtor,
is consistent with this goal [of ensuring a fresh start]. The exemption of future payments, however,
demonstrates a concern for a debtor's long-term security which is absent from the statute." Id. at
23. (emphasis in original) See also In re Wooford, 73 Bankr. 675 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (retirement plan
interests reasonably necessary for support only if present needs so indicate). But see In re Turpin,
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pensions by the forced or voluntary bankruptcy of an employee-debtor,
without which they could not gain access. While ERISA was designed to
be the primary authority in employee benefit law, it has been preempted
when a conflict exists with another federal law such as the Code. 14 2
If the debtor chooses or is required to follow the state scheme most
states have provisions parallel to the federal scheme in section 522(d). 143
Under all state schemes, though, a debtor may, by virtue of section
522(b)(2)(A) of the Code, exempt "any property that is exempt under
Federal Law, other than subsection(d) of this section.'" This exemp-
tion is characterized as the "federal exemption."
The issue for employees and their creditors is whether ERISA section
206(d)(1), or the compatible IRS section, creates a federal non-bank-
ruptcy exemption. If either does, then the entire interest in the benefit
plan is exempt from the bankruptcy estate. Section 522(b)(2)(A) of the
Code exempts "any property". The exemption, however, is not based on
what is reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor. The legisla-
tive history to section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Code lists several federal stat-
utes that Congress intended to be illustrative of exempt federal non-
bankruptcy statutes.145 Employee pension plans are not included in the
list. The overwhelming majority of cases hold that section 522(b)(2)(A)
644 F.2d 472, 474 (5th Cir. Unit A May, 1981) (decided under old Bankruptcy Act) ("Providing the
bankrupt with a 'fresh start' means assuring him that assets to which he may become entitled in the
future will be acquired free of any prebankruptcy obligations.").
142. See supra note 125.
143. It is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss the various state law schemes. For a discus-
sion of the various state laws see 7 COLLIER, supra note 138, at 5-776.
144. See supra note 138 (text of § 522(bX2)(A)).
145. The House and Senate Reports explaining the "Federal law other than subsection(d)" pro-
vision in § 522(b)(2)(A) provide an illustrative list of property exempted under federal law other
than the Code:
Foreign Services Retirement and Disability payments, 22 U.S.C. 1104;
Social security payments, 42 U.S.C. 407;
Injury or death compensation payments from war risk hazards, 42 U.S.C. 1717;
Wages of Fisherman, Seamen, and apprentices, 46 U.S.C. 601;
Civil service retirement benefits, 5 U.S.C. 729, 2265;
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act death and disability benefits, 33
U.S.C. 916;
Railroad Retirement Act annuities and pensions, 45 U.S.C. 229 (L);
Veterans benefits, 45 U.S.C. 352(E);
Special pensions paid to winners of the Congressional Medal of Honor, 38 U.S.C. 3101;
and
Federal homestead lands on debts contracted before issuance of the patent, 43 U.S.C. 175.
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 75, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5787, 5861; H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 360 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6316.
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does not recognize ERISA as a federal non-bankruptcy law. These cases
find ERISA's exclusion from the list to be highly probative of congres-
sional intent not to include ERISA as a federal non-bankruptcy
exemption. 14 6
In addition, the Fifth Circuit in Goff noted that ERISA section
206(d)(1) was fundamentally different from the statutes listed in the leg-
islative history to section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Code.147 The court recog-
nized that the property covered by ERISA includes a wide range of
benefit plans while the statutes listed in the Code's legislative history are
systems funded or created by the federal government.1 48 The court
stated that the narrow characteristics of the listed plans make up an "op-
erational thread" that federal statutes must contain to come within the
section.149 Only one court has reached a contrary conclusion. 10
ERISA benefit plans are not likely to be excluded from the bankruptcy
estate unless, as permitted in some jurisdictions, the plan has restrictions
on the transfer of interests and the applicable state law recognizes the
restrictions as a spendthrift clause. Also, federal and state exemption
schemes will likely protect only the part of an employee's benefit plan
funds necessary for his support. Therefore, if a creditor forces a debtor-
employee into bankruptcy, the creditor may very well gain access to
funds not accessible prior to bankruptcy.
146. See, eg., In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d
1488, 1491 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268, 1273-74 (8th Cir. 1984); In re GofI, 706
F.2d 574, 582-86 (5th Cir. 1983).
147. Goff, 706 F.2d at 583-84.
148. Id. at 585-86.
149. Id. The court reasoned private pension and welfare legislation is much broader than the
federally funded or created plans listed. Id. The court also noted that to qualify for tax benefits and
protection from creditors ERISA, through § 206(d)(1), only requires restrictions on transfers of in-
terests in benefit plans. The statutes in the legislative history also require similar restrictions as a
condition precedent to protection of the particular statute. Id. at 585. See also In re Daniel, 771
F.2d 1352, 1361 (9th Cir. 1985) (statutes in § 522(b)(2)(A)'s legislative history cover benefit plans
federal in nature while ERISA covers private plans). One commentator asserts, however, that the
operational thread is actually whether the statute exempts the property it covers from voluntary and
involuntary alienation. Therefore, ERISA should be considered as a federal exemption. See Note,
Exemption of ERISA Benefits Under Section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, 83 MICH. L. REV.
214, 231-33 (1984).
150. In re Hinshaw, 23 Bankr. 233, 235 (D. Kan. 1982) ("Statutes ... recognized as giving rise
to a Federal exemption of the type here being considered [considering § 522(b)(2)(A)] may be char-
acterized as nothing more than prohibitions against assignment or alienation.").
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V. PROPOSALS
A. Summary of Previous Arguments
This Note has demonstrated the lack of a consistent theme in the law
of creditors' rights to ERISA protected benefit plan funds. Part II de-
scribed the judicially created and congressionally adopted exception to
section 206(d) of ERISA. Part III demonstrated that regardless of the
employee's ability to access his pension funds, creditors are almost al-
ways barred from doing so, absent extraordinary circumstances. Part III
also noted that welfare plan funds are not protected from creditors and,
once vested, are garnishable. Part IV examined the effect of bankruptcy
law provisions, under which creditors may have access to pension and
welfare plan funds regardless of the policy concerns of ERISA.
B. Proposal: Federal Courts Should Consider the Purpose of Funds in
a Benefit Plan
Assuming that the policy of the Bankruptcy Code is to include pension
funds in the estate, then ERISA, by virtue of section 514(a), 151 cannot
affect the operation of the Code. 52 Prior to the debtor-employee's bank-
ruptcy, general creditors will be denied access to pension funds but,
likely will have access to welfare funds. Bankruptcy creditors, however,
likely will have access to at least some of the funds of either type of
employee benefit plan. 53 Consequently, to remedy the inconsistencies,
either the federal courts or Congress should modify the current applica-
tion of ERISA section 206(d)(l). t54
151. The majority of courts view the policy of the Bankruptcy Code to include benefit plans in
the estate unless applicable state law recognizes a plan as a valid spendthrift trust. See supra notes
130-36 and accompanying text. Many states will not protect funds in an alleged spendthrift trust if
more than necessary for the debtor's support. See 2 A. ScoTr, supra note 3, at §§ 151, 152.1. In
addition, many states will not hold a spendthrift clause valid if doing so violates public policy or a
statute. See, e.g., Electrical Workers Local I Credit Union v. IBEW Holiday Trust Fund, 583
S.W.2d 154, 161 (Mo. 1979) (spendthrift provision invalid to protect vacation benefits because they
are wages and thus garnishable by statute). Further, several courts will not exclude any pension
funds from the bankruptcy estate. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text. As set forth
earlier, the overwhelming majority of cases will not exempt a debtor's entire interest in an ERISA
benefit plan from the bankruptcy estate. In light of the above, courts rarely will protect an em-
ployee's interest in a benefit plan from bankruptcy creditors.
152. See supra note 146.
153. Under the federal or state bankruptcy schemes, the debtor-employee can exempt interest in
benefit plans to the extent they are reasonably necessary for the debtor's support. See supra notes
13942 and accompanying text.
154. Because Congress did not explicitly address creditors' rights in ERISA, the federal courts
1989]
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Although section 206(d)(1) has been interpreted to protect pension
plan funds from creditors,155 the protection need not cover all of the
funds in a plan. Creditors should have access to funds donated by an
employee to a pension in excess of an amount reasonably needed for the
employee's support later in life.'5 6 Employees can hardly have a justified
expectation to excess funds put in pension plans to evade creditors.1 57 In
addition, vacation and holiday plan funds pay the employee his or her
wages only over a short period of time. Allowing access to those funds
does not endanger the employee's future financial stability. ERISA
should not be used to preempt basic principles of debtor-creditor law that
allow creditors to be paid from the debtor's excess funds. Access to these
excess funds should not turn on whether an employee-debtor voluntarily
declares or is forced into bankruptcy. This Note's proposal allows equal
access by general creditors and bankruptcy creditors to the employees'
interest in their benefit plans.
In addition, access to excess funds should follow the plan laid out by
Congress in the Retirement Equity Act of 1984. Judgment creditors
should secure orders resembling Qualified Domestic Relation Orders
(Q.D.R.O.'s).'58 Such orders do not significantly increase the work of
plan administrators and allow these administrators to manage plans uni-
formly.' 59 Unlike Q.D.R.O.'s, however, general creditors, like bank-
may develop federal common law to fill in the gap left open by the legislature. See supra notes 13-14
and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
156. See Wohl, supra note 109, at 26-27 (courts should distinguish between voluntary employee
contributions reasonably necessary for retirement savings and contributions in excess of that
amount, consequently made for unlawful purposes).
157. This does not violate ERISA's purpose of ensuring the financial stability of benefit plans
and guaranteeing that employees will receive the benefits they expect. ERISA's purpose is to protect
funds so that employees will not lack financial support during retirement. Protecting anything more
would allow debtors to avoid creditors while ensuring their own enjoyment of surplus funds. See S.
REP. No. 93-127, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4734
(1974); see also A. ScoTr, supra note 3, at § 151. But see Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Irving Trust Co., 786
F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1986) (ERISA's purpose of ensuring receipt of expected benefits given great weight
in barring access to plan funds).
158. A plan administrator need only reduce the employee-debtor's accrued funds by the amount
specified in the order. See supra notes 34-35, 103 and accompanying text.
159. Q.D.R.O.'s allow payments to be made from a pension plan only when the debtor has
reached minimum retirement age. However, creditors should have access to welfare and pension
funds once they are payable to the employee. Calculation of what is necessary for reasonable sup-
port of the debtor can be done in the same manner in which bankruptcy courts calculate what is
needed. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text; Wohl, supra note 109, at 25-27 (discussing
methods of calculating what is reasonably necessary for support).
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ruptey creditors, should have access to funds that are payable to an
employee, regardless of whether the employee has reached minimum re-
tirement age.'16 Finally, employing a Q.D.R.O. format would address
some of the concerns expressed by the dissent in Mackey v. Lanier Col-
lection Agency.' 6'
C. Proposal: Alter the Terms of a Pension Plan at Bankruptcy
Another solution, espoused by at least one commentator, is for bank-
ruptcy courts to place restrictions on the terms of pension plans.' 62 If an
employee-debtor desires to protect his or her pension plan funds, then
courts should require the employee to consent to restrictions barring ac-
cess to the funds until the termination of the employment with the plan
sponsor. 163 Such restrictions would transform ERISA's restrictions on
fund transfers into a traditional spendthrift clause.164 Most courts would
thus exclude the newly restricted funds from the bankruptcy estate.' 65
This proposal, however, only protects the employee. Creditors would
have few ways in which to reach pension plan funds if this proposal were
accepted. The additional argument has been made that the added re-
strictions should exempt from the bankruptcy estate only those benefit
plan funds that are reasonably necessary for the debtor's support.'6 6
VI. CONCLUSION
Often, courts bar access by judgment creditors to ERISA protected
pension plan funds. Recently, the Supreme Court ruled that judgment
creditors can reach the funds in an employee's welfare plan.' 67 The argu-
ment has been made, however, that such access will hamper the effective
administration of welfare plans. Bankruptcy courts, on the other hand,
160. See Wohl, supra note 109, at 31-36.
161. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
162, Wohl, supra note 109, at 34.
163. Courts that do not recognize ERISA § 206(d)(1) as a spendthrift clause reason that, be-
cause the section does not bar free access to the funds, Congress did not intend to exclude the funds.
The danger in excluding such funds is that the debtor will access them after bankruptcy proceedings
and have more money than needed for his or her fresh start. These added restrictions would remove
this concern. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
164, But see supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 118-33 and accompanying text.
166, Wohl, supra note 109, at 34-36.
167. Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988).
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are likely to allow creditors access to benefit plan funds and most of these
courts will only protect a portion of the funds in a pension plan.
To create a consistent theme in the rights of creditors to ERISA bene-
fit plan funds, this Note has discussed two solutions. Either courts
should allow all creditors to have access to benefit plan funds except
those funds needed to endure financial stability upon retirement, or bank-
ruptcy courts should place restrictions on the terms of pension plans and
exclude the plans from the bankruptcy estate.
Charles G. Huber, Jr.
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